We are strongly inclined to believe in moral responsibility, that some human agents truly deserve moral praise or blame for some of their actions. However, recent philosophical discussion has put this natural belief in the reality of moral responsibility under suspicion. There are important reasons to think that moral responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, possibly rendering moral responsibility an impossibility.
This book lays out the major arguments for skepticism about moral responsibility and subjects them to sustained and penetrating critical analysis. "Moral Responsibility" lays out the intricate dialectic involved in these issues in a helpful and accessible way. The book goes on to suggest a way in which skepticism can be avoided, arguing that an excessive pre-eminence given to the will might lie at the root of skepticism of moral responsibility. Carlos Moya offers an alternative to skepticism, showing how a cognitive approach to moral responsibility which stresses the importance of belief would rescue our natural and centrally important faith in the reality of moral responsibility.

We are strongly inclined to believe in moral responsibility - the idea that certain human agents truly deserve moral praise or blame for some of their actions. However, recent philosophical discussion has put this natural belief under suspicion, and there are important reasons for thinking that moral responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, therefore potentially rendering it an impossibility. Presenting the major arguments for scepticism about moral responsibility, and subjecting them to sustained and penetrating critical analysis, Moral Responsibility lays out the intricate dialectic involved in these issues in a helpful and accessible way. A well-written and lively account, the book then goes on to suggest a way in which scepticism can be avoided, arguing that excessive pre-eminence given to the will might lie at its root. Offering an alternative to this scepticism, Carlos Moya shows how a cognitive approach to moral responsibility that stresses the importance of belief would rescue our natural and centrally important faith in the reality of moral responsibility.

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in problems related to human agency and responsibility by philosophers and researchers in cognate disciplines. The present volume brings together original contributions by leading specialists working in this vital field of philosophical inquiry. The contents represent the state of the art of philosophical research on intentional agency, free will, and moral responsibility. The volume begins with chapters on the metaphysics of agency and moves to chapters examining various problems of luck. The final two sections have a normative focus, with the first of the two containing chapters examining issues related to responsible agency and blame and the chapters in the final section examine responsibility and relationships. This book will be of interest to researchers and students interested in both metaphysical and normative issues related to human agency.

English summary: The collected studies in this volume reexamine the philosophical concept of causality and its efforts to explain human action by associating mental states of desire and belief with bodily actions. French description: En quoi consiste l'explication des actions humaines? Au sein de la philosophie analytique, la reponse standard a cette question, que les travaux de Davidson ont largement contribue a faconner, est la conception causaliste: expliquer une action consiste a mentionner la raison pour laquelle l'agent l'a accomplie, concue comme la combinaison particuliere d'etats mentaux (desir et croyance) dont l'occurrence est la cause des mouvements corporels constituant l'action. En identifiant les raisons a des causes, cette conception a fait ressurgir les questions metaphysiques modernes touchant la causalite mentale, la nature de l'esprit et sa relation au monde physique. Mais les difficultes auxquelles donne lieu le causalisme ne justifient-elles pas plutot son reexamen? C'est ce que se proposent de faire les auteurs des contributions reunies dans ce volume, que ce soit pour en defendre et en prolonger les intuitions fondatrices ou au contraire pour en contester le bien-fonde.